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1 Introduction
According to a widespread view, the ‘deep pockets’ of a conglomerate make its divisions more
‘entrenched’ compared to focused firms. On the back of the conglomerate’s financial strength,
its divisions are thought to be less likely to cut back on investments or even being shut down
after low cash flows, while they are supposedly more likely to engage in (predatory) behavior
aimed at harming competitor.1 This paper uses an optimal contracting model to put the notion
of ‘conglomerate entrenchment’ to formal scrutiny. In our model, firms can access the external
capital market, but agency problems with outside investors impose frictions. As it is diﬃcult
for firms to commit to repay investors out of future profits, investors keep firms on a tight leash
and make the commitment of fresh funds dependent on the repayment of earlier loans.
The first part of our analysis focuses on the conglomerate’s ability to pool cash flows across
divisions. Cash-flow pooling can enable the conglomerate to fully repay creditors even when
one division performs poorly. This provides each division with additional protection against a
shortfall in own cash flows.2 The flipside for the better-performing division is that by ‘cross-
subsidizing’ the underperforming division it risks not being refinanced itself. As a third implica-
tion of cash-flow pooling, we find that by promising investors a safer repayment a conglomerate
obtains better credit terms, leading to an overall higher probability of refinancing.
We show that these three implications of cash-flow pooling all work in the same direction,
reducing the sensitivity of a division’s operations to own cash flows compared to a focused firm.
Likewise, a focused firm is more likely to exit following low cash flows. The diﬀerences between
a conglomerate’s division and a focused firm are less pronounced if the agency problem with
investors is less severe and financing constraints are consequently reduced.
By focusing on divisions with homogeneous reinvestment opportunities, the first part of
our analysis abstracts from a second key aspect of joint incorporation. In an internal capital
1Antitrust authorities often harbor suspicions against conglomerate mergers, fearing further ‘entrenchment’ in
the concerned markets. A case in place is the European Commission’s resistance to the GE-Honeywell merger
(Case No. COMP/M.2220, July 2001). While the potential for ‘entrenchment’ has not been dismissed per se
in the U.S., the view is more benign–with the possible exception of firms that may cross-subsidize predatory
strategies from profits earned in regulated markets.
2The role of ‘co-insurance’ to smooth out repayments and, thereby, ease financing constraints has already
been documented elsewhere, e.g., in Diamond (1984), Fluck and Lynch (1999), and Inderst and Müller (2003).
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market, limited fresh funds are first allocated to the most profitable divisions. For less profitable
divisions, ‘winner-picking’ can more than undo the positive implications of cash-flow pooling,
increasing their cash-flow sensitivity and making exit more likely than for a stand-alone firm.
Recent evidence for ‘winner-picking’ comes fromMaksimovic and Phillips (2002), who showed
that conglomerates allocate more resources to units with better relative investment opportuni-
ties. In a similar spirit, Khanna and Tice (2001) document that diversified retail firms were
quicker to react following Wal-Mart’s entry into a local market, e.g., by shutting down their
discount business.3
The extant theoretical literature on predation and entrenchment focuses on the more vul-
nerable financial structure of new entrants (e.g., Telser (1966), Benoit (1984)).4 The financial
literature on competition and firm exit focuses likewise on the eﬀects of financial leverage. (See,
for instance, Kovenock and Phillips (1997) for an overview.)
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the benchmark of a focused
firm. Section 3 analyzes the implications of cash-flow pooling with homogeneous divisions.
Section 4 introduces ‘winner-picking’ and Section 5 concludes with an application to predation.
2 The Benchmark of a Focused Firm
Our model is a variant of Bolton and Scharfstein (BS, 1990). We consider a penniless firm that
operates in only one market or industry. The firm operates for at most two periods, t = 1, 2,
and requires each time a fixed investment of F > 0. There is a competitive market for financing.
Once financed, the firm realizes with probability 0 < 1 − θt < 0 the cash flow πh > 0.5 The
expected cash flow in t is denoted by π¯t := (1− θt)πh. We stipulate that continuing in t = 2 is
eﬃcient: π¯2 > F . (If π¯1 < F , we may view t = 1 as the ‘growth period’.) The respective states
of high and low (zero) cash flows are denoted by s ∈ S = {l, h}.
Importantly, only the fraction α of high cash flows is verifiable. This limits the repayment
3For benefits of ‘winner-picking’ see also Stein (1997). Scharfstein and Stein (2000) and Rajan, Servaes, and
Zingales (2000) argue that these benefits can be muted by internal rent seeking and power struggles.
4The industrial organization literature also analyzes exit behavior of multi-plant firms in oligopolies (e.g.,
Ghemawat and Nalebuﬀ (1990)). Interestingly, our result that diversification can both increase and decrease the
probability of exit may help to explain the ambiguous findings in the literature (e.g., Deily (1991)).
5BS set θ1 = θ2 and consider a monopolistic investor in their main analysis.
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that can be promised to the investor in t = 2 to απh. However, in t = 1 the investor can use the
threat of withholding refinancing to extract more than απh, but this is only incentive compatible
if the firm is rewarded with a strictly higher probability of refinancing: β(h) > β(l). The full
contractual problem is now as follows. In t = 1, the firm makes a repayment R(s) ≤ πs.6
Conditional on the revealed state and the corresponding repayment, the lender refinances the
firm with probability β(s).7 The optimal contract maximizes the firm’s ex-ante profits subject
to the lender’s break-even constraint and the firm’s incentive compatibility constraints.8
Proposition 1. Under the optimal financial contract, a focused firm with high cash flows repays
R(h) < πh and continues operations with probability β(h) = 1. If only the fraction
α < 2F/(π¯1 + π¯2) (1)
of cash flows is verifiable, the firm only continues with probability β(l) < 1 following low cash
flows. If (1) does not hold, we have β(l) = 1.
Proof. The proof uses arguments from BS and is thus kept short. In t = 2, the firm realizes
(1− α)π¯2 in case of refinancing. For R(h) > απh, incentive compatibility thus requires
R(h)− απh ≤ [β(h)− β(l)] (1− α)π¯2. (2)
The optimal contract maximizes the firm’s expected profits, θ1β(l)(1 − α)π¯2 + (1 − θ1)[πh −
R(h) + β(h)(1− α)π¯2], subject to (2) and the lender’s break-even constraint
θ1β(l)(απ¯2 − F ) + (1− θ1) [R(h) + β(h)(απ¯2 − F )] ≥ F, (3)
which binds by optimality. If (1) does not hold, (3) is satisfied for β(h) = β(l) = 1 and a unique
value R(h) ≤ απh. From π¯2 > F this is uniquely optimal. If (1) holds, (3) requires R(h) > απh
6We thus already set the repayment in t = 2 equal to απh or zero, depending only on the final cash-flow
realization. This is without implications for our results.
7One specification is that in t = 1 cash flows are first only privately observed by the firm. (Hence, β(s)
is conditional on the firm’s message s ∈ S.) Even if the cash-flow state becomes public knowledge–i.e., after
reinvesting fresh funds– the firm cannot be prosecuted for ‘consuming’ the fraction 1− α of high cash flows.
8Note that, as this is all verifiable, the optimal contract (i) forces the firm to invest the received funds, (ii)
prohibits the firm from obtaining financing from other sources, and (iii) ensures that the firm indeed shuts down
in case this is prescribed by the contract. In Inderst and Müller (2003) a weak legal environment prevents
investors from stopping firms to operate with their hidden (or ‘privately consumed’) funds after defaulting on
their repayment obligations. Moreover, for a discussion of renegotiations in case of forced shut-down see BS.
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and thus β(h)− β(l) > 0 from (2). By π¯2 > F it is optimal to minimize β(h)− β(l), implying
that (2) binds. Substituting the binding constraints (3) and (2), we obtain β(h) = 1 and
β(l) = (1− θ1)(π¯2 − F )− (F − απ¯1)
(1− θ1)(π¯2 − F ) + (F − απ¯2)
, (4)
while R(h) < πh is determined from substituting β(l) and β(h) into (2). Q.E.D.
If α satisfies (1), the lender can only break even if more than the verifiable component απh
is repaid in t = 1, which by incentive compatibility requires β(h) − β(l) > 0. Optimally, the
refinancing probability β(l) is chosen such that the investor just breaks even. (We always assume
that financing is feasible, which–as is easily shown–is the case if (1−θ1)(π¯2−F ) ≥ (F−απ¯1).)
Note that β(s) ≤ 1 could also represent the expansion of a scalable investment project. With
some caution, we may then suppose that the firm can raise the amount β(l)F of ‘long-term
finance’. Following default in t = 1, the amount of ‘short-term finance’ [1− β(l)]F is no longer
rolled over.9 Finally, diﬀerentiating β(l) in (4) yields the following result.
Corollary 1. For low values of α where (1) holds, β(h)− β(l) decreases with α.
Hence, if the agency problem (as measured by the non-verifiable fraction 1−α) becomes less
severe, the firm is refinanced with higher probability and the cash-flow sensitivity, β(h)− β(l),
is reduced. If α is suﬃciently high, refinancing becomes independent of first-period cash flows:
β(h) = β(l) = 1. Firms may have lower agency problems as they, for instance, operate in an
environment with stronger investor protection or as their investments are more ‘tangible’.10 We
have more to say on the impact of α below when we compare focused firms with conglomerates.
3 Conglomerates with Homogeneous Divisions
A conglomerate operates two divisions, i ∈ I = {A,B}, both requiring in t = 1, 2 the investment
of F > 0. High cash flows are independently realized with probabilities θit. In this section, we
assume that divisions are homogeneous: θAt = θBt = θt. The cash-flow states in t = 1 are
S = {(h, h), (h, l), (l, l)} with probabilities q(s) and cash flows r(s).11 That is, q(l, l) = (θ1)2
9The firm is prevented from using any ‘hidden’ (or ‘consumed’) funds (1− α)πh to scale up the investment.
10A monotonic relationship between measures of financial constraints and corporate investment policies has
been documented by numerous papers building on the seminal work of Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen (1988).
11Aggregating cash flows across all divisions would be less adequate for business groups, where units often
borrow separately. For an analysis of the debt capacity of business groups see Bianco and Nicodano (2002).
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and r(l, l) = 0, q(h, l) = 2θ1(1− θ1) and r(h, l) = πh, q(h, h) = (1− θ1)2 and r(h, h) = 2πh.
The likelihood of refinancing depends again on the interim payout to investors, R(s) ≤ r(s).
The contract specifies the probabilities with which the investor injects zero, F , or 2F in t = 2.
Depending on the (revealed) state, we denote the probability of receiving F by γ1(s) and that
of receiving 2F by γ2(s). No refinancing is received with probability 1 − γ1(s) − γ2(s). If the
firm receives less than 2F , it decides which project to continue. As divisions are homogeneous,
they are treated identically. Consequently, each division has the refinancing probability βi(s) =
β(s) = γ1(s)/2+γ2(s).12 In what follows, it will often be convenient to suppose that the contract
directly specifies the probabilities βi(s).13
We next isolate three implications of forming a conglomerate. First, pooling cash flows across
divisions allows to smooth out repayments to investors, shielding both divisions from being shut
down after low own cash flows. Formally, recall from Proposition 1 that a focused firm with
high cash flows repays strictly less than πh, i.e., πh − R(h) > 0, while after low cash flows it
is sometimes shut down. In the conglomerate, these ‘excess’ cash flows R(h) − πh can be used
to make up for the underperformance of another division.14 The flipside for the high cash-flow
division is that ‘cross-subsidization’ may reduce its own refinancing probability, which is the
case if β(h, l) < 1. Finally, by promising a safer repayment a conglomerate can obtain ‘better’
credit terms, which in our model leads to an overall higher refinancing probability, i.e., including
the state where both divisions have zero cash flows: β(l, l) > β(l).
Proposition 2. Under the optimal financial contract, divisions in a homogeneous conglomerate
get refinanced as follows. If α is high such that (1) is not satisfied, we have β(s) = 1 for all s.
Otherwise, we have β(h, h) = 1 and β(l) < β(l, l) < 1, while for β(h, l) we have two possibilities.
In case πh ≥ 2π¯2, it always holds that β(h, l) = 1. For πh < 2π¯2, β(h, l) = 1 holds if α is not
too low or F not too high, while otherwise we have that β(l, l) < β(h, l) < 1.
Proof. Suppose that (1) holds. (The case where it does not hold is again immediate.) As noted
previously, it is convenient to suppose that contracts directly specify β(s), which are chosen to
12 In case of scalable projects, the investor would provide the aggregate funds F [γ1(s) + 2γ2(s)] = 2Fβ(s).
In this case, setting βA(s) = βB(s) would also be uniquely optimal if we had symmetric but strictly concave
investment technologies.
13With heterogeneous divisions the firm and the investor will both prefer to continue the most profitable project,
i.e., there is no conflict of interest regarding the choice of projects.
14This eﬀect is also dealt with in Inderst and Müller (2003).
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maximize
P
s∈S q(s)[r(s)−R(s)+2β(s)(1−α)π¯2] subject to the investor’s break-even constraintX
s∈S
q(s)[R(s) + 2β(s)(απ¯2 − F )] ≥ 2F, (5)
the cash-flow constraints r(s) ≥ R(s) for s ∈ S, and the set of incentive compatibility constraints.
In the Appendix, we show the following intuitive results: (i) β(h, h) = 1 and r(h, h) ≥ R(h, h)
never binds; (ii) we can restrict consideration to the incentive constraints
R(s)− αr(s) ≤ 2 [β(s)− β(l, l)] (1− α)π¯2 for s ∈ {(h, h), (h, l)} , (6)
which both bind at an optimum; and (iii) if r(h, l) ≥ R(h, l) does not bind we have β(h, l) =
1. If r(h, l) ≥ R(h, l) does not bind (Case 1), we can next substitute the binding incentive
compatibility constraints (6) into the binding break-even constraint (5) to obtain
β(l, l) = [1− (θ1)
2](π¯2 − F )− (F − απ¯1)
[1− (θ1)2](π¯2 − F ) + (F − απ¯2)
, (7)
which by 1− (θ1)2 > 1 − θ1 strictly exceeds β(l) in (4). If r(h, l) ≥ R(h, l) binds (Case 2), we
have from R(h, l) = πh and (6) that β(h, l) = πh/(2π¯2) + β(l, l), which together with (6) for
(h, h) can be substituted into (5) to obtain
β(l, l) =
[(1− θ1)2 + θ1(1− θ1)πhπ¯2 ](π¯2 − F )− (F − απ¯1)
(1− θ1)2(π¯2 − F ) + (F − απ¯2)
. (8)
Comparison with (4) reveals again that β(l, l) > β(l).15 Next, Case 1 applies if πh ≥
2[1− β(l, l)]π¯2, where β(l, l) satisfies (7). As dβ(l, l)/dα > 0 with β(l, l)→ 1 as α converges to
the threshold in (1), Case 1 applies for all α if it does so for α = 0, while otherwise it applies
if α ≥ α, where 0 < α < 2F/(π¯1 + π¯2). Note also that dβ(l, l)/dF < 0 in (7) and that for
α = 0 we have β(l, l)→ 1 as F → α(π¯1+ π¯1)/2. Finally, at the (highest feasible) value F where
β(l, l) = 0, we have for α = 0 that Case 1 applies if πh ≥ 2π¯2. Q.E.D.
We briefly comment on when the two cases β(h, l) = 1 and β(h, l) < 1 apply. Intuitively,
β(h, l) = 1 holds if the financing problem is less severe as less funds are required or as a higher
fraction of cash flows is verifiable. Alternatively, β(h, l) = 1 always holds if πh ≥ 2π¯2. Here,
the intuition is that a high value of πh implies high ‘excess’ cash flows R(h)− πh, allowing the
15 If we substitute β(l, l) = β(l) from (4) into (5), the investor’s profits equal 2(π¯2−F )(1−θ1)θ1[πhπ¯2 −(1−β(l))] >
0, implying β(l, l) > β(l) to make (5) binding.
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conglomerate to obtain refinancing for both divisions even if only one generated high cash flows.
Note next that for each division the (expected) sensitivity of operations to own cash flows equals
θ1 [β(h, l)− β(l, l)] + (1− θ1) [β(h, h)− β(h, l)] . (9)
The following result mirrors Corollary 1.
Corollary 2. For low values of α where (1) holds, an increase in α strictly decreases the
sensitivity to own cash flows (9) for each division in a homogeneous conglomerate while it strictly
increases its refinancing probability in each state (where not already β(s) = 1).
Proof. The assertions follow as dβ(l, l)/dα > 0 holds from (7) in case β(h, l) = 1, while for
β(h, l) < 1 we have dβ(l, l)/dα > 0 from (8) and dβ(h, l)/dα = dβ(l, l)/dα. Q.E.D.
In the remainder of this section, we compare a conglomerate to a focused firm.
Corollary 3. If (1) holds, joint incorporation in a homogeneous conglomerate strictly increases
both the probability with which a business is continued following low own cash flows and its
(ex-ante) expected probability of continuation.
Proof. Proposition 2 implies the first assertion as β(l, l) > β(l) and β(h, l) > β(l). Next,
(1− θ1)2β(h, h) + 2θ1(1− θ1)β(h, l) + (θ1)2β(l, l) > (1− θ1)β(l) + θ1β(l),
holds by β(l, l) > β(l) surely if β(h, l) = 1, while otherwise it holds from β(h, l) > [1 + β(l)]/2,
which follows as in this case β(h, l) = πh/(2π¯2) + β(l, l). Q.E.D.
Cash-flow pooling (partially) insures a division against being cut oﬀ from refinancing fol-
lowing low own cash flows. A higher ex-ante probability of refinancing is also intuitive as the
conglomerate uses the ‘excess’ funds πh−R(h) in a more eﬃcient way, i.e., to secure refinancing
of the other division. (As is easily checked, R(h, l) exceeds the respective payouts of two focused
firms.) Finally, the following results follow immediately from Proposition 2.
Corollary 4. If (1) holds, joint incorporation in a homogeneous conglomerate strictly decreases
the sensitivity to own cash flows.
Overall, Corollaries 3 and 4 confirm the view that conglomerates are more ‘entrenched’ as
their divisions are more shielded from a shortfall in own cash flows and as the conglomerate as a
whole enjoys better access to external finance. However, Corollaries 3 and 4 only hold strictly if
α is not too small. Otherwise, i.e., if firms are not financially constrained, there is no diﬀerence
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in the investment (and exit or continuation) behavior of focused firms and conglomerates.16
Finally, it is noteworthy that the diﬀerences made by joint incorporation are entirely due to
the independence of first-period cash flows of A and B and not due to the larger size of the
conglomerate. To see this, suppose that A and B had perfectly correlated cash flows in t = 1.
By q(h, l) = 0, none of the eﬀects that derive from cash-flow pooling can be at work and joint
incorporation has, consequently, no eﬀects: β(h, h) = β(h) and β(l, l) = β(l).
4 Heterogeneous Divisions
We now extend the analysis by considering conglomerates with heterogeneous divisions. In
particular, to introduce a second key aspect of the internal capital market operated in a con-
glomerate we specify that one division, say B, oﬀers more profitable reinvestment opportunities:
π¯B2 > π¯A2 as θA2 > θB2 . Consequently, the firm optimally uses refinancing first for division B, i.e.,
for each cash-flow state s we have that βA(s) > 0 holds only if βB(s) = 1. Joint incorporation
thus shields again division B from a shortfall in own cash flows. Intuitively, this has a more
pronounced eﬀect on B the more likely it is that A produces high cash flows.
Proposition 3. Suppose B is financially constrained (condition (1)) and has more profitable
reinvestment opportunities. Under joint incorporation, B has (i) a higher continuation probabil-
ity after low own cash flows, (ii) a higher (ex-ante) expected continuation probability, and (iii)
a lower sensitivity to own cash flows. The diﬀerences to the focused firm decrease with θA1 .
Proof. See Appendix.
For division A with less profitable reinvestment opportunities, ‘winner-picking’ in the con-
glomerate may reverse the findings of Corollaries 3 and 4, making A ‘weaker’ than if it was
operated separately. In what follows, we identify conditions for when this holds. We assume
πh ≥ π¯B2 + π¯A2 . (10)
Assumption (10) ensures that both divisions are refinanced for (h, l).17
16That diversification is more likely to create value if capital markets are less well developed has been found
in Comment and Jarrell (1995). We are not aware of studies relating diﬀerences in exit and investment behavior
between conglomerates and focused firms to measures of investor protection or capital market development.
17 If (10) does not hold, the analysis becomes very tedious and we fail to obtain clear-cut results. The appendix
contains a discussion of all cases, showing also that βi(h, l) = 1 always holds if α is not too low or F not too
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Proposition 4. Suppose B is financially constrained when operated separately. Then there
exists 0 < θ¯ < 1 such that under joint incorporation, A has for θB1 < θ¯ (i) a higher continuation
probability after low own cash flows, (ii) a higher (ex-ante) expected continuation probability,
and (iii) a lower sensitivity to own cash flows. For θB1 > θ¯, all three results are reversed.
Proof. See Appendix.
Proposition 4 questions the general validity of the notion that a conglomerate’s divisions are
(financially) stronger than respective focused firms. The internal capital market operated in a
conglomerate works to the disadvantage of divisions with less profitable reinvestment opportu-
nities.18 The dependence of the results in Proposition 4 on θB1 is again intuitive. For instance, if
B always generates high cash flows in t = 1, A’s funds are never used to repay investors so as to
ensure continuation of B. Moreover, in case B is not financially constrained, it is also intuitive
that A’s refinancing probability would not suﬀer from joint incorporation.
5 Discussion: An Analysis of Predation
We next apply our results to study the incentives for predation. We proceed in two steps. First,
we analyze whether joint incorporation protects a business from predation. Second, we analyze
whether a conglomerate’s division is more likely to engage itself in predatory activities.
Threat of Predation. We follow once again BS and assume that another firm, C, can prey
on A’s business in t = 1. Predation comes at costs e > 0 to C and increases A’s probability of
having low first-period cash flows to θˆA1 > θA1 . C 0s profits in t = 2 increase by ∆ > 0 if A exits.
Suppose first that A is separately incorporated. At the beginning of t = 1, C decides whether
to prey and A raises fresh funds. 19 C’s incentives to prey depend on A’s cash-flow sensitivity.
Given the contracts from Proposition 1, A is only secure from predation if
(θˆA1 − θA1 )
£
βA(h)− βA(l)
¤
∆ ≤ e. (11)
high–irrespective of whether (10) is satisfied.
18 It is again straightforward to show that the firms’ joint profits are strictly higher under joint incorporation.
Before raising finance, the owners of A and B would thus optimally merge (and co-manage) their businesses. (See,
however, the discussion of strategic eﬀects in Section 5.)
19As noted in BS, this is akin to first letting A raise its finances, while contracts can not be credibly revealed
to C and, thereby, are of no use as a strategic instrument. As in BS, predation is also non-observable.
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This holds always if A is not financially constrained, while for βA(l) < 1 the ‘costs-to-benefits’
ratio of predation for C, e/∆, must not be too low. Likewise, in a conglomerate A is only secure
from predation if its expected own cash-flow sensitivity is again not too high:
(θˆA1 − θA1 )
£
θB1
£
βA(h, l)− βA(l, l)
¤
+ (1− θB1 )
£
βA(h, h)− βA(h, l)
¤¤
∆ ≤ e. (12)
Comparing (11) with (12), we can use our previous analysis of cash-flow sensitivities (Corol-
lary 4 and Propositions 3-4) to obtain the following results.20
Proposition 5. Joint incorporation always better protects A from predation if A has better
reinvestment opportunities than B, i.e., in this case (11) implies (12), but not vice versa. The
same holds if A and B are homogeneous. In contrast, if B has better reinvestment opportunities
and is financially constrained, there exists 0 < θ¯ < 1 such that this holds only for θB1 < θ¯, while
for θB1 > θ¯ the result is reversed, i.e., (12) implies (11), but not vice versa.
If forming a conglomerate puts A at a competitive disadvantage by making predation more
likely, this raises the question why A is not operated separately in the first place. One benefit
of joint incorporation is that the other division, B, is more protected against predation. In
addition, we know that joint incorporation creates strictly positive eﬃciency gains, which may
already more than outweigh any strategic disadvantage in business A.21
Incentives for Predation. Suppose now that A can prey on its competitors, in which case
A has lower cash flows in t = 1 but higher cash flows in t = 2. Precisely, predation leads to
an increase from θA1 to θˆ
A
1 and to a decrease from θA2 to θˆ
A
2 . Denote πˆAt := (1 − θˆ)πh such
that πˆA1 < π¯A1 and πˆA2 > π¯A2 . As in Proposition 5, we are again interested in when our original
20For brevity’s sake, Proposition 5 stops short of a full equilibrium analysis. If no predation is expected, the
values βi(s) are clearly optimal such that no-predation is indeed an equilibrium if (11) and (12) hold, respectively.
Likewise, no-predation is only an equilibrium if these conditions hold. For a range of parameters, however,
multiple equilibria exist. To see this for the focused firm, suppose predation is expected and the resulting
financial contract gives rise to values βˆA(s), where θˆA1 > θA1 implies βˆ
A
(l) < βA(l) from (4). Predation then pays
for C if
³
θˆA1 − θA1
´ h
βˆA(h)− βˆA(l)
i
∆ ≥ e, implying together with (11) that both predation and no-predation
are equilibria for intermediate values of e/∆. Hence, while predation can only be successful if A is financially
constrained, the expectation of predatory activity can itself make financial constraints more severe.
21By our previous analysis, these eﬃciency gains come in two types. First, as found in Section 3 cash-flow
pooling allows a more eﬃcient use of ‘excess funds’ in the state (h, l). Second, ‘winner-picking’ allows to redirect
limited refinancing to the more profitable division, B.
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contracts support a no-predation equilibrium. But this time it is A that must be prevented from
preying. In case of separate incorporation, we find that this is only the case if
θˆA1 − θA1
θA2 − θˆ
A
2
≥ θˆA1 βA(l) + (1− θˆ
A
1 )βA(h). (13)
(This is formally derived in the proof of Proposition 6.) That is, A’s expected refinancing
probability after predation, θˆA1 βA(l) + (1− θˆ
A
1 )βA(h), must be suﬃciently low. This is intuitive
as A can only benefit from predation if it is refinanced. If A is not financially constrained,
as βA(l) = βA(h) = 1, condition (13) becomes θˆA1 − θA1 ≥ θA2 − θˆ
A
2 , which transforms to
π¯A1 + π¯A2 ≤ πˆA1 + πˆA2 . That is, a firm that is not financially constrained chooses not not prey only
if predation is a negative (or zero) NPV investment.22 Consider next a conglomerate where A
has more profitable refinancing opportunities, both with and without predation (θˆA2 < θA2 < θB2 ).
Given the respective contracts, the conglomerate prefers not to prey only if23
θˆA1 − θA1
θA2 − θˆ
A
2
≥ θˆA1
£
θB1 βA(l, l) + (1− θB1 )βA(h, l)
¤
+(1θA D (Þ£
θB
1  D
Proposition 6. The incentives to prey are always higher for the conglomerate if A has better
reinvestment opportunities than B, i.e., (14) implies (13), but not vice versa. The same holds
if A and B are homogeneous. If B has better reinvestment opportunities and is financially
constrained, we have that: (i) If also θB2 − θˆ
A
2 is suﬃciently low (in particular, this holds always
if θB2 < θˆ
A
2 ), there exists 0 < θ¯ < 1 such that for θB1 > θ¯ the result is reversed and a conglomerate
has less incentives to prey, while (ii) for high values of θB2 − θˆ
A
2 this is not the case ( θ¯ = 1).
Proof. See Appendix.
We finally comment on the role of the diﬀerence θB2 − θˆ
A
2 for the case where refinancing of A
is less profitable than refinancing of B without predation but more profitable after predation:
θˆA2 < θB2 < θA2 . Here, if the firm deviates and preys, this changes the ordering of reinvestment
priorities. (The new refinancing probabilities, which we denote by βˆi(s), are then simply given
by βˆA(s) = βB(s) and βˆB(s) = βA(s), reflecting the reversal in preferences.) While we know
from our previous results that this leads to a strictly higher probability of refinancing A than in
the focused case, there is an important countervailing eﬀect at work. While for the focused firm
predation increases the total expected payoﬀ from refinancing by πˆA2 − π¯A2 , the net increase in
the conglomerate is smaller: πˆA2 − π¯B2 . This in turn works in a direction opposite to the increase
in A’s refinancing probability, making predation less profitable for the conglomerate.
6 Appendix
Omitted steps for Proposition 2. Denote the constraint that s does not mimic bs by
Cbss : R(s)− αr(s) ≤ 2 [β(s)− β(bs)] (1− α)π¯2. (15)
It is straightforward that we can focus on the ‘downwards’ incentive compatibility constraints.
(Formally, after solving the ‘relaxed’ program it is easily checked that the ‘upwards’ constraints
are satisfied.) As in the proof of Proposition 1, for (1) the lender can only break even if
β(l, l) < 1, while we have R(h, h) < 2πh and β(h, h) = 1. By the same argument, β(h, l) < 1
can only be optimal if R(h, l) = πh. We argue next that Cl,lh,h, C
l,l
h,l, and C
h,l
h,h all bind at an
optimum. If Ch,lh,h does not bind, C
l,l
h,l implies that also C
l,l
h,h does not bind, which together with
R(h) < 2πh allows to marginally adjust dR(h) > 0, while choosing dβ(l, l) > 0 to keep (5)
binding and dR(h, l) ≤ 0 to still satisfy Cl,lh,l. As is easily seen, this raises the firm’s expected
payoﬀ by (θ1)2dβ(l, l)2(π¯2 − F ). Next, we argue again to a contradiction and assume that
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Cl,lh,l does not bind, which by the binding C
h,l
h,h implies that also C
l,l
h,h is slack. We marginally
adjust dβ(h, l) < 0 and choose dR(h, h) = −dβ(h, l)2(1 − α)π¯2 to keep Ch,lh,h binding. If we set
(θ1)2dβ(l, l) = −2θ1(1−θ1)dβ(h, l), the firm would be indiﬀerent while the investor’s break-even
constraint is relaxed by −dβ(h, l)(1−α)π¯2, allowing to adjust the contract to increase eﬃciency.
Finally, if Cl,lh,l and C
h,l
h,h bind, also C
l,l
h,h must bind. Q.E.D.
Derivations for the case with heterogeneous divisions. We maximize
P
s∈S q(s)[r(s) −
R(s) +
P
i∈I βi(s)(1− α)π¯i2] subject to the investor’s break-even constraintX
s∈S
q(s)[R(s) +
X
i∈I
βi(s)(απ¯i2 − F )] ≥ 2F, (16)
the cash-flow constraints r(s) ≥ R(s) for s ∈ S, and the set of incentive compatibility constraints.
We can rely on the same reasoning as for Proposition 2 to show that: (i) βA(h, h) = βB(h, h) = 1
and r(h, h) ≥ R(h, h) never binds; (ii) we can restrict consideration to the incentive constraints
R(s)− αr(s) ≤
X
i∈I
£
βi(s)− βi(l, l)
¤
(1− α)π¯i2 for s ∈ {(h, h), (h, l)} , (17)
which are binding at an optimum; and (iii) if r(h, l) ≥ R(h, l) does not bind we have βi(h, l) = 1
for i = A,B. By an analogous reasoning and using π¯B2 > π¯A2 , we have that (iv) βB(h, l) = 1 and
βA(h, l) > 0. As in Proposition 2, r(h, l) ≥ R(h, l) does not bind in Case 1, where βA(h, l) = 1,
while it binds in Case 2, where βA(h, l) < 1. Using (17), Case 1 applies if
πh ≥ π¯B2 [1− βB(l, l)] + π¯A2 [1− βA(l, l)]. (18)
In Case 1 there are two subcases: βA(l, l) > 0 (Case 1a) and βA(l, l) = 0 (Case 1b). In Case 1a,
βA(l, l) > 0 implies βB(l, l) = 1. Using the binding constraints (17) and (16), we obtain
βA(l, l) = (π¯
A
2 − F )(1− θA1 θB1 )− (2F − απ¯A1 − απ¯B1 )− (F − απ¯B2 )
(π¯A2 − F )[1− θA1 θB1 ] + (F − απ¯A2 )
. (19)
In Case 1b, we have βA(l, l) = 0 and obtain from (16)
βB(l, l) =
£
(π¯B2 − F ) + (π¯A2 − F )
¤
(1− θA1 θB1 )− (2F − απ¯A1 − απ¯B1 )
(π¯B2 − F )[1− θA1 θB1 ] + (F − απ¯B2 )
. (20)
Using that βA(l, l) > 0 if and only if βB(l, l) = 1, we have that Case 1a applies if
(π¯A2 − F )[1− θA1 θB1 ] ≥ (F − απ¯A1 ) + (F − απ¯B1 ) + (F − απ¯B2 ). (21)
For Case 2, recall that by optimality βA(l, l) > 0 only holds if βB(l, l) = 1. But then we
can conclude from (18) that in Case 2 it must hold that βA(l, l) = 0. With R(h, l) = πh,
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constraint (17) for (h, l) becomes next πh = π¯B2 [1 − βB(l, l)] + βA(h, l)π¯A2 . Solving for βA(h, l)
and substituting together with (17) for (h, h), we obtain from (16)
βB(l, l) = (π¯
B
2 − F )(1− θA1 θB1 ) +Π− (2F − απ¯A1 − απ¯B1 )
(π¯B2 − F )(1− θA1 θB1 )−Π0 + (F − απ¯B2 )
, where (22)
Π : = (π¯A2 − F )
·
(1− θA1 )(1− θB1 ) +
£
θA1 (1− θB1 ) + θB1 (1− θA1 )
¤ πh − π¯B2
π¯A2
¸
,
Π0 : = (π¯A2 − F )
£
θA1 (1− θB1 ) + θB1 (1− θA1 )
¤ π¯B2
π¯A2
.
From (18) we see that Case 2 can not apply if (10) holds, while if (10) does not hold inspection
of (22) shows that Case 2 can again be ruled out for high α and low F .
Proof of Proposition 3. From the preceding calculations we have for B that βB(h, h) =
βB(h, l) = 1. In case βB(l, l) = 1 the assertions hold trivially. For βB(l, l) < 1 we consider
first Case 1b, where dβB(l, l)/dθA1 < 0 holds by (20). To show that βB(l, l) > βB(l), it is
convenient to substitute βB(l, l) = βB(l) into the investor’s payoﬀ for the conglomerate. This
yields (1 − θA1 θB1 )(π¯A2 − F ) − (F − απ¯A1 ) + θB1 (1 − θA1 )(π¯B2 − F )
£
1− βB(l)
¤
> 0. (Recall that
(1−θA1 )(π¯A2 −F ) ≥ F−απ¯A1 if A can be financed under separate incorporation.) As the investor’s
payoﬀ is strictly decreasing in βB(l, l), we thus have βB(l, l) > βB(l). For Case 2 we can proceed
analogously to show that dβB(l, l)/dθA1 < 0 and βB(l, l) > βB(l). Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 4. The diﬀerence in probabilities following low own cash flows is
(1− θB1 )[βA(h, l)− βA(l)] + θB1 [βA(l, l)− βA(l)]. (23)
To see that (23) is strictly decreasing in θB1 , note that βA(l, l) < βA(h, l) = 1, 0 < βA(l) < 1, and
dβA(l, l)/dθA1 ≤ 0. (For βA(l, l) > 0 this follows from (19).) Moreover, (23) is strictly positive
at θB1 = 0. At θB1 = 1, (23) is strictly negative if and only if βA(l, l) < βA(l). This holds surely
in Case 1b, where βA(l, l) = 0, while in Case 1a we can substitute θB1 = 1 into (19) and use (4)
for βA(l) to see that βA(l, l) < βA(l) holds if and only if 0 < (F −απ¯B1 )+ (F −απ¯B2 ). Next, the
diﬀerence in ex-ante continuation probabilities is
(1− θB1 )[(1− θA1 )
£
βA(h, h)− βA(h)
¤
+ θA1
£
βA(h, l)− βA(l)
¤
] (24)
+θB1 [(1− θA1 )
£
βA(h, l)− βA(h)
¤
+ θA1
£
βA(l, l)− βA(l)
¤
],
while the diﬀerence in sensitivities is
(1− θB1 )[
¡
1− βA(h, l)
¢
− (1− βA(l))] + θB1 [
¡
βA(h, l)− βA(l, l)
¢
− (1− βA(l))]. (25)
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By βA(l, l) < 1 and dβA(l, l)/dθB1 < 0, (24) and (25) are strictly increasing in θB1 , while they are
again strictly negative at θB1 = 0 and strictly positive at θB1 = 1 if βA(l, l) < βA(l). Comparing
(23), (24), and (25) shows finally that the thresholds for θB1 are the same. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 6. Substituting the binding constraint (2), a focused firm’s payoﬀ is
(1− α)
£
π¯A1 + βA(l)π¯A2
¤
if (1) holds. If A deviates and preys, its expected payoﬀ is
θˆA1 βA(l)(1− α)πˆA2 + (1− θˆ
A
1 )
£
πh −RA(h) + βA(h)(1− α)πˆA2
¤
. (26)
Substituting once more from (2) for R(h), (26) transforms to
(1− α)
h
πˆA1 + βA(l)π¯A2 +
h
(1− θˆA1 )β(h) + θˆ
A
1 β(l)
i
(πˆA2 − π¯A2 )
i
,
which is not larger than (1−α)
£
π¯A1 + βA(l)π¯A2
¤
if ρ := (θˆA1 − θA1 )/(θA2 − θˆ
A
2 ) is not smaller than
ρF := θˆ
A
1 βA(l) + (1 − θˆ
A
1 )βA(h). Take next a conglomerate. Given the contractual choices of
γ1(s) and γ2(s), we denote the firm’s optimal refinancing choices by βi(s) without predation
and by βˆi(s) after predation. (Of course, βˆA(s) + βˆB(s) = βA(s) + βB(s) = γ1(s) + 2γ2(s).)
Substituting again from (2), the firm’s payoﬀ equals
2(1− α)[π¯A1 + π¯B1 + βA(l, l)π¯A2 + βB(l, l)π¯B2 ] (27)
without predation and
θB1 θˆ
A
1 (1− α)
h
βˆA(l, l)πˆA2 + βˆ
B
(l, l)π¯B2
i
(28)
+
h
θˆA1 (1− θB1 ) + θB1 (1− θˆ
A
1 )
i h
πh −R(h, l) + βˆ
A
(h, l)(1− α)πˆA2 + βˆ
B
(h, l)(1− α)π¯B2
i
+(1− θˆA1 )(1− θB1 )
h
2πh −R(h, h) + βˆ
A
(h, h)(1− α)πˆA2 + βˆ
B
(h, h)(1− α)π¯B2
i
after predation. Suppose now first that θA2 < θB2 , implying βA(h, l) = βA(h, h) = 1 and
βA(l, l) > βA(l) from the proof of Proposition 3. Moreover, we have optimally βˆi(s) = βi(s).
Substituting and comparing (27) with (28), the firm does not deviate and prey if ρ ≥ ρC :=
θB1 θˆ
A
1 βA(l, l) + (1 − θB1 θˆ
A
1 ), which strictly exceeds ρF . Suppose next that divisions are ho-
mogeneous without predation, θit = θt, implying θˆ
A
2 < θB2 such that optimally βˆ
A
(h, h) =
βˆA(h, l) = 1. Moreover, from Proposition 2 we have βˆA(l, l) = max{1, 2β(s)} > βA(l), where
β(s) = βi(s) is the symmetric refinancing probability without predation. The new threshold
ρC := θ1θˆ
A
1 βˆ
A
(h, l) + (1− θ1θˆ
A
1 ) satisfies again ρC > ρF .
Suppose finally that θB2 < θA2 . If also θB2 < θˆ
A
2 holds, predation does not change reinvestment
priorities: βˆi(s) = βi(s). Using βi(h, l) = 1 from (10), we obtain now ρC := θB1 θˆ
A
1 βA(l, l) + (1−
16
θB1 θˆ
A
1 ) such that ρC > ρF if and only if 1 − βA(l) > θB1 [1 − βA(l, l)]. The existence of a
threshold 0 < θ¯ < 1 such that ρC > ρF holds if and only if θB1 < θ¯ follows then from the
proof of Proposition 4. This argument is now easily extended to the case of equality, θB2 = θˆ
A
2 .
If θB2 > θˆ
A
2 , however, predation changes the reinvestment priorities: βˆ
A
(s) = βB(s). After
substitution to obtain again ρC , we find that ρC > ρF holds only if
1− βA(l) > θB1
"
1−
£
βB(l, l)πˆA2 + βA(l, l)π¯B2
¤
−
£
βA(l, l)π¯A2 + βB(l, l)π¯B2
¤
πˆA2 − π¯A2
#
. (29)
If βA(l, l) = 0, this transforms to 1 − βA(l) > θB1 [1 − βB(l, l)(θB2 − θˆ
A
2 )/(θA2 − θˆ
A
2 )]. This
holds surely for θB1 = 0, while we know from Proposition 4 that the right-hand side is strictly
decreasing in θB1 . It thus remains to show that the inequality holds at θB1 = 1 if and only if
θB2 − θˆ
A
2 is not too small. This finally follows as (θB2 − θˆ
A
2 )/(θA2 − θˆ
A
2 ) is strictly decreasing in θˆ
A
2
(where θˆA2 < θB2 ). The case where βA(l, l) > 0 is analogous. Q.E.D.
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